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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Respondent, Commissioner on behalf of the Idaho State Tax Commission, entered a 
ruling of a tax deficiency against the Appellants, James and Kaylynn Stivers, dated January 18, 
2011 and ordered them to pay $16,915. The Stivers appealed the ruling to the Board of Tax 
Appeals and offered the Commission a check of $500 and their only substantive asset, their 
home, as surety for the 20% bond deposit required by Idaho Code 63-3049(b ), and pursuant 
thereof, which was rejected by the attorney for the Tax Commission, Phil N. Skinner (Clerk's 
Record on Appeal, pages 17, 56 and 58). 
Consequently, the Board of Tax Appeals denied the Stivers their right to appeal for 
failure to provide security as described by the Tax Commission Administrative and Enforcement 
Rules rule 600 (IDAP A 35.02.01.600). Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. 
On July 18, 2011, the Stivers filed a Complaint against the Idaho State Tax Commission 
in Idaho District Court, Second Judicial District, as a court of original jurisdiction for citizens 
with complaints against agencies of state government (Clerk's Record, page 6). The Court 
dismissed the case in a final ruling on April 17, 2012, for lack of jurisdiction due to the statutory 
limitations imposed by LC. 63-3049(b) (Clerk's Record, page 83). 
Pursuant of the Idaho Constitution Article V, Section 2 and Article V, Section 9, 
Appellants now petition the Idaho Supreme Court to exercise the judicial power of the state and 
either try the case as the only constitutional court of original jurisdiction over the subject matter, 
or in the alternative, to issue a writ of mandamus to the district court to do so on its behalf. 
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Background 
It appears that only the Idaho Supreme Court has been endowed with the unencumbered 
judicial power of the state and has the authority to review the constitutional validity of various 
statutes and rules under which the Idaho State Tax Commission operates. Heretofore, the Board 
of Tax Appeals and the District Court have proceeded as administrative tribunals operating under 
the authority of statute and limited by statute. 
The Idaho Supreme Court is not so limited. In addition to its many duties, it has the 
responsibility to exercise the judicial power of the state and to review the various actions of the 
executive and legislative branches of government (Id. Const. Art. V, § 13). In this case, the 
Appellants will argue that LC. 63-3049(b) is unconstitutionally vague if administrative agencies, 
such as the State Tax Commission, are allowed the discretion to interpret it arbitrarily and in a 
manner which disregards the rights of the citizen or which violates its constitutional mandate of 
fair and equal taxation (Id. Const. Art VII, §§ 3, 5 - the legislature having made income taxable 
property). 
While property bonds are routinely used in criminal cases, for the Tax Commission, if the 
Respondent's attorney is to be believed, they are not acceptable substitutes for the 20% rule. The 
Respondent's attorney has never provided to the Appellants any policy statement issued by the 
Tax Commission, no minutes of proceedings, nor even an internal memo, which would support 
his claim that a property bond would not satisfy the statute. In criminal cases, it must be readily 
assumed that the purpose of the property bond is in the interest of justice as an alternative to cash 
should sources of credit not be available to the accused. Why, then, in the interests of justice is it 
not provided as an alternative in civil cases? 
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In the fall of 2008, the nation was in the grips of financial panic. So dire was the crisis, 
the U.S. Treasurer issued a warning to the Congress that if emergency action was not taken, the 
nation would experience a financial collapse that would bring a halt to commerce. The prospects 
of such a collapse resulted in congressional discussion of martial law and other emergency 
measures to maintain order. Quick action brought an end to the panic, but the nation 
experienced a precipitous decline of equitable value in virtually all assets. The contraction 
resulted in depression-style conditions, especially in the building industry. The principal source 
of livelihood for the Stivers was then and remains connected to economic conditions in the 
building industry. They have either been unemployed or underemployed in recent years (Clerk's 
Record, p. 58). It was in the midst of this crisis that the tax deficiency was imposed by the Tax 
Commission. 
For various reasons, the Stivers found the Commissioner's ruling to be unfair and wanted 
their "day in court." Economic hardships prevented them from paying the 20% bond deposit; so 
in the alternative, they offered the value of their home, which according to the county assessor's 
office, was worth far more than the tax ruling. The Stivers felt that a property bond should have 
been acceptable, considering the economic conditions. They applied for loans, but were turned 
down (Clerk's Record, p.56). They felt the Tax Commission would be agreeable. It wasn't. 
Appellants have come to believe that the Tax Commission views them as "tax protestors" and 
that this mischaracterization explains why the Commission has acted capriciously against them 
by withholding vital information and denying them their day in court (Clerk's Record, pgs. 12, 
73). 
After further research, they discovered that they were not alone. Many of their fellow 
citizens were being bullied by the Tax Commission. They learned about a culture of profligacy 
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at the Commission in which out-of-state corporations were given "sweetheart" deals to settle 
their tax deficiencies while ordinary citizens were given none (Clerk's Record, pgs. 59-63). 
They looked at the Commission's process and calculations and began to see a corrupt 
practice of inflating a tax liability by lumping tax years together into one claim to keep the 
ordinary citizen with limited resources out of court. 
The Appellants are prepared to argue that the Tax Commission has misread its statutory 
authority to tax beyond the statute of limitations; that it has relied upon faulty or spurious 
affidavits; and that it has perpetuated a policy of favoring corporate persons over and against the 
interests of natural persons, thereby, violating the anti-discrimination clause of the 14th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF- 6 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Appellants petition the Court to the Relief Requested in the Complaint filed with the 
District Court or to other remedies which the Court might deem just. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The first matter before the Court is whether the Idaho Tax Commission had the 
statutory authority to reject the Appellants' offer of a property bond. In the 
larger context, did the Legislature intend by creating statute 63-3049(b) to give 
the Commission that authority? Furthermore, if it did intend to give that 
authority, did the legislature itself have the constitutional authority to do so? 
The Idaho Constitution requires in Article I, Section 18 that citizens are to be 
guaranteed free and speedy justice "without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice." 
We might rightly assume that the legislature does not have the authority, nor 
would it ever have the intent to empower a state agency with the power to 
violate this right. 
Did the Tax Commission's rejection of the Appellants' offer of a surety 
bond have the effect of denying them "free and speedy" justice? It would 
certainly seem so. The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 36.01.01 requires 
that the Commission put the taxpayer's rights first and foremost: 
"These rules will be liberally construed to secure just, speedy, and economical 
determination of all issues presented to the Board [of Appeals]." (Rule 21) 
By analogy, if the legislature felt it was important and the courts have so 
upheld it that property bonds in criminal cases serve the interests of justice, we 
might wonder why that is not so in a civil case? Are not genuine rights of the 
citizen at stake in civil matters, as well? 
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2. Article I, Section 19 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits local and special laws 
"for the assessment and collection of taxes" and "regulating the practice of 
courts of justice." Without the property bond, citizens are forced to seek 
sureties from private, for-profit establishments, such as banks and other 
lenders, which are under no legal obligation to lend at all and otherwise are free 
to charge whatever interest they choose within the limits allowed by statute. If, 
for example, banks were lending in the 1st Judicial District but not the 2nd 
Judicial District, then it would be easier to obtain justice in the first district and 
not the second. Denial of the property bond would have the effect of leaving 
the citizen at the mercy of private lenders and would have the perverse effect of 
"regulating" access to the courts of justice. In tax cases, it would exclude the 
poor and others who pose a credit risk. Lenders want to make a profit. The 
interests of justice and the 20% rule are not to provide a source of profit for 
private lenders. The intent is to prevent frivolous lawsuits and to guarantee the 
fidelity of the citizen in the advent of an adverse judicial ruling, which the 
property bond accomplishes. 
As for "local and special" laws for the assessment and collection of taxes 
prohibited by the Idaho Constitution, we can see how excluding the property 
bond has this precise effect. The Constitution is forbidding a disproportionate 
and selective enforcement of the tax laws. Clearly, those who have access to 
credit have an advantage over those who do not, and to the extent that certain 
groups are more appealing to lenders (such as large corporations), we would 
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expect to see tax collectors avoiding those who can defend themselves in court 
and concentrating on easy targets, such as working class families. 
3. The Appellants are prepared to argue that the State Tax Commission built its 
case against the Stivers by drawing from alleged tax obligations of over a 
decade, beyond the customary 3-year limitation. It relied upon faulty or 
spurious affidavits, and an assumption that the Stivers were tax protestors. This 
led to a capricious interpretation and selective enforcement of the tax collection 
laws. Vital information was withheld from the Stivers until it was almost too 
late. Specious reasoning was used to justify rejecting the property bond and no 
care was taken to show good cause or due diligence in considering the their 
request for documentation or explanation. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case is not about the legitimacy of the state income tax. It is not about the right of 
the Tax Commission to collect taxes. This case is about the right of the citizen to his day in 
court. It is about whether it is just for state government to force its citizens into debt peonage to 
private lenders who hold the keys of access to justice. It is about discrimination between persons 
who have different kinds of property: property controlled by banks as opposed to property owned 
and controlled by the people. 
Respectfully submitted this 2i11 day of September, 2012 
James W. Stivers, Pro Se 
Kaylynn A. Stivers, Pro Se 
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